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let these conflicts be played out by the actors themselves. A proper theory of justice 
must go beyond this – it must be able to guide political practice and to point forward, 
towards the right and away from the wrong, regardless of the beliefs held true in 
society, by dominant groups or by others. This, however, Honneth’s approach cannot 
do, fueled as it is by feelings of disrespect as experienced by subjects themselves, and 
failing as it does to discriminate between warranted and unwarranted experiences.
3. Final Remarks
In conclusion, while Honneth might be right that the injustice suffered by Fraser’s 
skilled white worker can be understood in terms of recognition, it is not clear that his 
purely recognition-theoretical approach can adequately answer how such claims should 
be evaluated. Granted – and this weakens my argument – I have presupposed what were 
to be shown: that economy cannot be reduced to culture alone; that not everything 
is interpretations of culturally shaped interests; that there are truths and falsities that 
go beyond mere culture. Or, referring to the examples above, that it might be that 
Nozickian libertarians or van Parijs’ free-riding surfers are wrong. Plain and simple. 
Not wrong within the interpretative schema that is our culture, but wrong regardless 
of what they themselves, or people in general, consider right or wrong.
For the claim that Honneth fails to assess our subjective experiences theoretically, 
or pre-politically, is meaningful only on the assumption that such assessments are pos-
sible. This in turn requires that there is a deeper point of departure available, one that 
is morally prior to subjects’ experiences and valid regardless of culture. That, however, 
I have not argued for. Acknowledging the incompleteness of my argument, I therefore 
offer these remarks only as an attempt to shed further light on what I consider to be 
the main shortcomings of Honneth’s approach and of its theoretical presuppositions.
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Axel Honneth has furnished a penetrating critique of the dichotomy between redis-
tributive or economic conflicts and conflicts over social and cultural identity that has 
recently been re-endorsed by Nancy Fraser. I think it may be helpful to re-examine 
this particular issue here precisely because it allows us to shed some light on two closely 
interconnected questions. The first one, formulated in negative terms, concerns the 
renewed attempt to overcome certain fundamental assumptions of the classical Marxist 
tradition. The second, expressed in positive terms, is concerned with clarifying the 
principal theoretical commitments of an ambitious socio-philosophical approach that 
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attempts to interpret the basic motivational factors behind all social struggles exclusively 
in terms of human convictions and aspirations that are eminently moral in character. 
First, in section 1, I discuss the negative side of the question, in order to show how this 
critique of the dualistic “Marxist approach” favoured by Fraser basically revives earlier 
criticisms that have been directed against the Marxist schema of “basis” and “super-
structure.” In section 2, I indicate how the abandonment of this schema, in contrast 
to the sort of criticisms raised by members of the first generation of Critical Theory, is 
based on a version of Habermas’s normative-theoretical approach (one that goes beyond 
the admittedly crucial distinction between “life world” and “system”), but Honneth 
also suggests, albeit cautiously, the need to reconsider Gramsci’s position in this regard, 
a position that  seems to me to represent a more balanced approach to the problem. In 
section 3, I show how Honneth has radicalized his theoretical model of intersubjective 
recognition by claiming that the moral response to the experience of disrespect provides 
the basic motivation for all forms of social struggle, so that that the role of material inter-
ests, and of the economic sphere more generally, is now effectively absorbed within the 
recognition model. In section 4, I attempt to show that this analytical perspective leads 
to an exaggerated emphasis upon the moral sphere in relation to the ethico-political and 
the politico-economic sphere, and that this imbalance impairs the heuristic fruitful-
ness of the recognition paradigm itself. I believe that this tendency can be countered 
through a more balanced approach that draws on the insights and contributions of the 
Gramscian perspective, including his thematization of struggles for hegemony. This 
approach would allow us, without falling back into a dualist position, to broaden the 
complex spectrum within which we can clearly analyse both the phenomenology of the 
experience of disrespect and the struggles for recognition that emerge from this experi-
ence. Finally, in section 5, I summarize the conclusion of the argument. 
1. Reflections on Superstructure
In negative terms, Honneth’s principal criticism of the “Marxist tradition” defended 
by Frazer springs from the “conviction that Marx makes some serious mistakes in his 
analysis of capitalist society. The central objection here concerns his unmistakable 
propensity to dismiss the moral power of the equality and achievement principles 
as cultural superstructure [als kulturellen Überbau], although they provided the newly 
emerging market society with its legitimating framework in the first place.”21 These 
principles play a decisive role in determining how “labor” is valued and understood: 
“Between the new status hierarchy – the gradation of social esteem according to the 
values of industrial capitalism – and the unequal distribution of material resources 
there is, to this extent, more than a merely external relation of “superstructure” and 
“basis” [mehr als das bloß äusserliche Verhältnis von “Überbau” und “Basis”], of “ideol-
ogy” and objective reality.”22 Honneth thus goes further than merely criticizing the 
21  Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition. A Political-Philosophical Exchange, 
London: Verso, 2003, p. 150. Unless otherwise indicated, all other page references in the text 
refer to this text. 
22  Ibid., p. 141.
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schema that posits the superstructure as a reflection of “the basis,” something that had 
already been undertaken by the earliest exponents of Critical Theory. For the task is 
to change the whole perspective from which the Marxist schema should be addressed: 
the question is no longer that of explaining the absence of revolutionary class con-
sciousness, or of testing the historical effectiveness of political ideologies. Once the 
underlying Marxist philosophy of history has been abandoned, we can clearly recog-
nize the “tendency to see the proletariat alone as the stand-in for all social discontent” 
as “the fatal mistake Marxist theory made over and over again.”23 The crucial question 
now is to show that the critique – like the justification and in fact, at least in part, the 
very constitution – of the capitalist criteria of value that define the terms of redistribu-
tive conflicts rests on principles of a “moral” kind. What is at issue now is thus no lon-
ger simply the thesis (now almost obsolete anyway) that the superstructure is merely 
the “reflection” of the economic basis, but the separation itself between the sphere 
of economics and that of culture (between the “material” level and the “cultural” 
or “symbolic” level). Here therefore Honneth moves both against Marx and against, 
or rather beyond, Habermas. And he has continued to work in this same direction 
throughout the last few years, by insisting on the normative elements that he believes 
are immanent to the economic sphere.24
2. The Roots of Normativity
Still speaking negatively, the second essential component in his critique of Fraser and 
the Marxist tradition concerns the basic socio-anthropological model underlying this 
approach. In this regard, Honneth emphasizes how the tradition of critical social theory 
– influenced by the idea that a single “unified interest” could be ascribed to the working 
class, and that there was therefore absolutely no need for “a separate explanation” of the 
moral expectations of society that (individual and collective) subjects entertain – privi-
leged an essentially utilitarian anthropological model that simultaneously precluded the 
possibility of developing an analysis of those moral factors that ultimately sustain the 
redistributive conflicts themselves.25 From this point of view, an articulated theory of 
recognition “should serve to make visible a deep layer of morally motivated conflicts 
that the tradition of critical social theory has not infrequently misrecognized, owing 
to its fixation on the concept of interest.”26 For this fixation explains “why the attempt 
has never really been undertaken within the tradition of critical social theory to come 
to a preliminary conceptual understanding [sich konzeptuell […] vorzuverständigen] of the 
normative sources of social discontent. With the great exception of Jürgen Habermas – 
alongside whom Antonio Gramsci should perhaps be placed – for various reasons a cer-
tain tendency to anti-normativism has prevailed, which essentially prohibited subjects 
from being endowed with normative expectations vis-à-vis society.”27 In this respect 
23  Ibid., p. 124.
24  See in particular, A. Honneth, “Arbeit und Anerkennung. Versuch einer Neubestimmung,” 
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 56 (2008) 3, pp. 327-341. 
25  Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 127.
26  Ibid., p. 136; see also p. 134.
27  Ibid., pp. 128-29.
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Honneth thus distances himself from the earlier generation of critical theorists, and 
follows Habermas in insisting on the necessity of adopting an explicitly normative per-
spective for analyzing social reality and the suffering and discontent that afflicts it. He 
also appeals, albeit rather cautiously, to Antonio Gramsci in this connection. I believe 
that this appeal is entirely legitimate in one respect. For Gramsci’s writings reveal an 
unequivocal tendency to acknowledge and appreciate the ethical and moral dimension 
that is inherent in social struggle. And he addresses this dimension within a theoreti-
cal framework that, while clearly Marxist in character, is by no means economistic in 
a reductive sense, and expressly questions the schema of base and superstructure in a 
number of respects. Nonetheless, when we consider Honneth’s critical observations 
regarding the role of material interests in generating social conflicts and struggles, and, 
more generally, the radicalized version of his theoretical model that we shall explicitly 
discuss below, I believe that the Gramscian approach has a distinct advantage here. For 
it is more successful in combining the two dimensions, that of moral norms and that 
of material interests, that produce and sustain social (and political) struggles, without 
thereby falling back into a basically dualistic perspective. 
3. Radicalizing the Theoretical Model of Recognition
In positive terms, the abandonment of the schema of base and superstructure, along 
with the repudiation of the socio-anthropological model associated with it, leads 
directly to the attempt to interpret all forms of injustice, whether in the context of 
redistributive issues or that of questions regarding social and cultural identity, within 
the unified framework of a theory of recognition. As far as the more strictly economic 
level is concerned, this means that we are in a position “to offer evidence for the 
strong thesis that even distributional injustices must be understood as the institutional 
expression of social disrespect [von sozialer Missachtung] – or, better said, of unjustified 
relations of recognition.”28 The task of demonstrating this thesis is unfolded as follows: 
“Since the central institutions of even capitalist societies require rational legitimation 
through generalizable principles of reciprocal recognition, their reproduction remains 
dependent on a basis of moral consensus.” And this implies that what “motivates indi-
viduals or social groups to call the prevailing social order in question and to engage 
in practical resistance is the moral conviction that, with respect to their own situations 
or particularities, the recognition principles considered legitimate are incorrectly or 
inadequately applied.” It follows from this that “a moral experience that can be mean-
ingfully described as one of ‘disrespect’ [Missachtung] must be regarded as the motiva-
tional basis of all social conflicts [als die institutionelle Basis aller sozialen Kämpfe].”29 And 
this thesis amounts to the claim that “the experience of social injustice always corre-
sponds to the withholding of what is taken to be legitimate recognition.”30 Thus redis-
tributive conflicts, like “all” other social conflicts, would also belong to the sphere of 
struggles for recognition in general. 
28  Ibid., p. 114.
29  Ibid., p. 157.
30  Ibid., p. 170.
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I believe that this line of argument clearly reveals how the attack on the economis-
tic and utilitarian model once defended by the Marxist tradition has been radicalized 
through the elaboration of a normative framework that tends to leave little room for 
thematizing the interrelations between moral expectations and material interests. Yet 
in Honneth’s book The Struggle for Recognition, it seems to me, the question of the differ-
ence between struggles connected with power, goods, and interests of a material kind 
on the one hand, and the intersubjective conditions of identity formation on the other, 
was addressed more cautiously. As Honneth writes: the “model of conflict, based on a 
theory of recognition, should not try to replace [eben nicht ersetzen] the first, utilitarian 
model but only extend it [sondern allein ergänzen wollen].”31 The programmatic thesis, 
articulated here, that “recognition-theoretic models of conflict have the duty not only 
to extend but possibly to correct” the utilitarian model,32 seems to me to preserve the 
constitutive possibility of questioning, in addition to the moral sphere of recognition, 
that of the power relations and material interests that also serve to shape the motiva-
tional factors behind social conflicts and struggles. In other words, this suggested a the-
oretical horizon that did offer a distinct alternative to the previous model, and avoided 
the danger of a certain excessively unilateral approach by integrating, substantially 
correcting, but not completely replacing that model. I think Honneth’s caution in this 
respect is entirely justified. For however much we investigate the differentiated struc-
ture of the moral concepts of recognition and disrespect, I do not believe it is possible 
to subordinate the sphere of material interests entirely to this normative framework, 
effectively treating these interests as derivative or merely surrogate expressions of such 
concepts. In the sometimes rather heated debate with Fraser, on the other hand, the 
traditional “fixation” with the instrumental category of “interest” seems to have been 
almost entirely replaced with theoretical speculations regarding the normative concept 
of “recognition.” It is precisely this imbalance in the argument that could, I believe, be 
redressed if we gave due consideration to Gramsci’s contribution to the problem. 
4. The Ethico-Political Dimension and the Question of Hegemony
If we reduce the motivational bases of all social struggles solely to the moral dimen-
sion of disrespect, the more specifically ethico-political and politico-economic aspect 
of such experiences ends up assuming second place. Yet if disrespect is to provide the 
motivation for engaging in a given social struggle, it must be interpreted in a particu-
lar vocabulary that, as Honneth himself stresses in The Struggle for Recognition, allows 
for “translation” into social and political terms that can at least guarantee its univer-
sal application to a given social group. It is this operation that permits individuals to 
share and rethink their own experience so that it can effectively provide the emotional 
incentive and force for a given social movement, whether actual or emergent.33 Yet 
it seems to me that this act of translation plays a more significant role than is really 
31  Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992, p. 265;  [The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, translated by J. Anderson, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 165].
32  Ibid., p. 166. 
33  Ibid., pp. 259 ff.
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acknowledged in Honneth’s analyses, and this becomes particularly clear as soon as we 
consider cases where it fails to occur: when, for example, the experience of disrespect 
is confined to the realm of purely personal resentment, or is turned directly against the 
subject himself. Or we may think of those “depressive” reactions in which subjects who 
can be considered a target of institutionalized disrespect become socially isolated and 
withdraw entirely into their own suffering or discomfort.34 This type of reaction can be 
traced back to that broad range of emotional processes that I would describe as “regres-
sive.” Rather than developing a positive kind of reaction that can be translated into 
some form of social struggle, subjects such as this passively accept the disrespect they 
have received, often interpreting and justifying this with arguments and considerations 
that neutralize the emancipatory potential of the experience, and thus remaining effec-
tively crushed by their own suffering. I believe that the analysis of such cases, which are 
certainly not that exceptional, should play a significant role in the context of a renewed 
critical theory that specifically undertakes to identify and evaluate the emancipatory 
potential within the experience of social suffering. Similarly, it seems to me that this 
negative and regressive aspect of the issue also tends to be obscured and neglected under 
the influence of a reinterpreted Hegelian model of the struggle for recognition, the 
basic teleological orientation of which requires the almost uninterrupted and progres-
sive development in the moral and ethical level of western societies. 
But the crucial question to which I would like to draw attention here is this. Once 
we have acknowledged the central importance of this process of “translation,” and thus 
of the “political” character that is intrinsic to the moral reactions of individual sub-
jects – in other words of the fact that “feelings of social injustice are always shaped by 
public discourses”35 – we must also proceed, at the same time, to develop a more radi-
cal political interpretation of the phenomenology of moral experience that Honneth 
has presented. My own view is that Gramsci’s investigation of the ethico-political 
dimension of social struggle and his related attempt to conceptualize the struggle 
for hegemony must be counted amongst the most significant conceptual resources 
for pursuing just such an approach. I believe that a renewed engagement with this 
perspective could help to shed considerable light upon the various hegemonic devices 
and approaches that combine to define the syntax and semantics of a language that is 
capable of neutralizing the emancipatory potential of social suffering, and thus in a 
position to perpetuate the dominant consensus, in spite of the suffering experienced 
by the subjects involved (and I believe that it is the element of suffering here that dis-
tinguishes this question from that regarding the role of mere “ideologies”36). But once 
we reintroduce the question of ethico-political hegemony into the foundations of the 
phenomenology of the moral experience of disrespect, the more strictly economic 
34  I have attempted to explore the consequences of such cases in relation to issue of recognition 
in more detail elsewhere. See M. Solinas, “Vite svuotate. Per una critica dell’impatto psicosociale 
del capitalismo contemporaneo,” Costruzioni Psicoanalitiche, 10 (2010) 20, pp. 71-81 and Id., “Die 
Melancholie, der Geist des Kapitalismus und die Depression,” Freie Assoziation, 13 (2010) 4, pp. 
119-152.  
35  Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition, p. 250.
36  See A. Honneth, “Anerkennung als Ideologie,” Westend. Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, 1 
(2004), pp. 51-69. 
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dimension of material interests simultaneously reacquires a decisive role in the para-
digmatic struggle for recognition. At the very moment when the feelings and moral 
expectations of moral subjects reveal their “political” nature, as the progressive or 
regressive character of the reactions in question clearly reveals, it becomes imperative 
to reconsider the political-economic forces and relations that determine the outcome 
of the struggle for hegemony amongst different social groups. In other words, the 
exercise of hegemonic power represents a fundamental condition for the emergence 
or the neutralization of the motivations that are required to provoke social struggles 
for recognition. And once we bear in mind, as Gramsci writes, that “if hegemony is 
ethico-political, it cannot fail to be economic as well,”37 it is clearly necessary to pro-
ceed not only from the ethico-political to the economic level, but also in the opposite 
direction, tracing the path that leads from the economic to the ethico-political level, 
and from here, to the level of morality. 
5. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, I believe that we can only endorse Honneth’s renewed and vigor-
ous attempt to overcome the economism and radical anti-normativism of the more 
orthodox Marxist tradition by re-emphasizing an absolutely crucial dimension of all 
social struggles – including those connected with the economic sphere (conflicts over 
redistribution) – as this emerges from the phenomenology of the moral experience of 
disrespect. At the same time, however, I think it is also necessary to move towards a 
more decisive political understanding of this experience: when we posit “disrespect” 
as the “motivational basis of all social struggles,” we must also always acknowledge 
the crucial role played by the ethico-political context within which such experience 
takes concrete shape. In fact, it is the struggles for hegemony that determine how far 
the moral feelings and perceptions of the subjects involved can or cannot be translated 
into ethical, social, and political terms, and thus provide the semantic and conceptual 
conditions that are required if a given moral experience is to furnish an effective moti-
vational stimulus for any particular social struggle. This broader perspective, it seems 
to me, would serve to redress the rather unilateral emphasis upon the cultural sphere 
of recognition in relation to the economic sphere of material interest. Without simply 
falling back into the trap of dualism, and thus overemphasizing one or other of the 
two poles involved, Gramsci’s approach to the issue of hegemony allows us to consider 
the reciprocal relations between the economic and the cultural sphere in a unified 
manner, and thus to reconstruct a dynamic relationship between the level of morality 
and the level of material interests that, in this regard, exhibits a circular, or we could 
also say dialectical, movement. 
(Translated from Italian by Nicholas Walker)
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37  A. Gramsci, “Noterelle sul Machiavelli,” Q, 13 (XXX), 18, 12a. 
